Every field is `volatile()`, which is what puts the settings card on the
Plugins page — and what makes the resolved config carry a reference per field
rather than a value. Every read was a plain-value test (`typeof x === 'string'`,
`Number(x)`, `x !== true`), so all of them were false and the plugin behaved as
if nothing had been configured.
The card displayed and persisted correctly the whole time, because the settings
wire unwraps references for display; only the plugin's own reads were broken.
Reads now go through `configValue()`, and the tool takes a fresh snapshot per
call, which is what lets an edit reach a running instance.
Two things a user setting this up hit immediately.
The card drew `embeddingApiKey` twice. The render loop walked every entry in
FIELDS, and the secret — which is drawn by hand, as a write-only password
control — was one of them, so a second control appeared beside it: an ordinary
text input, echoing the key in clear as you typed. One key, two boxes, one of
them visible. The loop skips secrets now, and the tests count controls rather
than checking that each expected label is present, because a duplicate beside
the real control passed the old assertions.
`status` could not answer the one question a new user cannot look up: how wide
is this model? The probe that reports it was gated on every required setting
being present, so in exactly the state that needs the answer — dimensions
unset — it reported nothing and said "Missing: embedding_dimensions". It now
runs whenever the endpoint can be named (a model and a base URL), and the
status message names the width it observed:
Missing: embedding_dimensions. The endpoint is reachable and returned 768
dimensions, so set embeddingDimensions to 768.
The probe also tells "not set yet" apart from "set wrong", because the two have
different remedies.
Also documents both ways to read the width by hand, since a wrong value is
frozen into the index at first use and costs a full re-embed to correct.
Three test-only spots had baked in the machine this repository was developed
on, and the repository is publicly readable, so they shipped that machine's
shape to anyone who cloned it:
* the end-to-end embedding backend was pinned to a private LAN address;
it is now read from DSH_SLOPO_E2E_API_BASE, defaulting to Ollama's own
loopback address, so the machine running the suite supplies its own;
* the real-slopo test resolved discovery from a hardcoded root home, which
meant it could only ever run for one user — it resolves from the running
user's home now, which is also the fix for everyone else;
* the harness-slot contract tests read the global npm tree by absolute
path; they go through this repository's own node_modules symlink, which
is already relative to the checkout.
No user-facing behaviour changes: the test files are not in the published
package, and the default configuration was already free of machine-specific
values — every address, path and key defaults to empty and is resolved per
user at runtime.
0.1.7-rc.2 moved four things this bundle was built on, and every one of them
failed quietly rather than loudly, so the plugin looked installed and did
nothing:
* `ctx.settings.installSection(...)` is gone. The call threw into a
`try/catch` that only logged a warning, so the settings namespace was never
registered and `configure` had nowhere to persist. An entry's exported
Config IS the form now; the namespace is the Loader entry id the bundle's
patch declares, and `ctx.settings.configure({ auto: false })` is what claims
that entry's own page.
* `settingsScope` and the `settings.plugin.item` slot are gone. The card
registered into both, so it never rendered — the tab draws the intersection
of served namespaces and registered cards, and that intersection was empty.
It now registers into `plugins.bundle.config` keyed by the bundle's package
name, over the `configForms` service, and uses the framework's own form
chrome (`SettingsFormModel` / `SettingsForm` / `SettingsValueField` /
`SettingsSecretField`) instead of the hand-rolled equivalent. A save is one
revision-fenced write.
* `ctx.shell.run(spec)` is gone. Every action that runs a command threw
`shell.run is not a function`; the seam is now
`await ctx.shell.execute(ctx.shell.resolve(request)).result()`.
* A job's `owner` is a session id, not the agent object. The wrong owner
registered a job no session could collect or cancel, and the producer's
`done` resolved `output` where the registry reads `result`, so a finished
job handed back nothing.
Two conformance gaps went with them: a Config field that is not marked
`volatile()` is invisible to every settings UI — the form projection keeps only
volatile fields, and an entry with no form is dropped from `settings.describe`
entirely — and `embeddingApiKey` was a plain field, so the key rode every
settings read back to the browser. It is `role('secret')` now: the browser is
told whether a key is stored and never receives the key.
Also declares the `@deepseek-ai/dsh-*` peerDependencies the compatibility gate
reads, so an incompatible runtime refuses this plugin at startup instead of
half-loading it.
Verified against a real 0.1.7-rc.2 boot: `settings.describe` serves the entry
with `autoGenerate: false`, the key redacted and reported only as `set: true`,
and no startup diagnostics. The host mock in the tests now has no `run` and no
`installSection`, so those seams are contract-tested rather than assumed, and
the browser tests read the installed harness's own slot catalog and package
exports — a rename fails a test instead of quietly emptying a page.
The tool backgrounded EVERY long action and exposed an inverted `foreground`
flag. dsh-tool-bash does neither: its parameter is `run_in_background`, it
defaults to foreground, and the model opts in. That difference is what made a
finished job go uncollected.
The evidence, from this session's own log: the only slopo job that ever ran was
slopo-1, and the agent KILLED it — `kill()` sets `reported = true`, which
suppresses the completion notice by design, because a caller who asked to stop
something does not want to be told it stopped. The agent then worked around the
tool entirely and re-ran slopo through bash, which is where the six notices in
that session came from. Nothing was broken; the tool was asking the caller to
depend on a best-effort signal.
So the query actions return their report directly. Only `prepare` — index plus
embed, the genuinely long and watchable step, and the one the user asked to be
able to watch — backgrounds by default. Any action can still be backgrounded
with `run_in_background: true`.
The render now names the collect call explicitly (`job_output` for that id, with
`wait: true` when blocked on it) instead of the vaguer "read the job output when
it settles", so a caller that is not woken still has an unambiguous next step.
I checked the waiter path while I was in there: a timed-out `wait` decrements
`waiters` in a `finally`, so it does not leak and does not suppress the notice.
That was my first hypothesis and it is wrong — worth recording, since it was the
plausible one.
The gate tests use a canned shell runner, and two of them build a real
slopo-shaped SQLite file to prove the warm-database hole is closed: the summary
line says zero new units while the database says 8,607 unembedded, and the gate
must believe the database.
Those fixtures insert in one transaction. Row-by-row they were 8,607 individual
fsyncs, which took two minutes and timed the suite out - worth knowing before
writing another one.
The probe returned `error: undefined` on a dimension match. `undefined` is not a
JSON value -- JSON.stringify silently drops it from an object -- so the shape
looked harmless and was not: the harness enforces the declared output schema
against the canonical value before materialising it, and an explicit undefined
property fails that check. A perfectly healthy status call could not be returned
at all.
Fixed at the boundary rather than at each site. Every return now funnels through
`toJsonValue`, which drops undefined properties exactly as JSON.stringify would,
maps non-finite numbers to null (same reasoning: JSON.stringify(NaN) is "null"),
turns an undefined array slot into null rather than shifting indices, and refuses
a circular value instead of recursing forever. `update` was carrying
`errorCode: undefined` and `ensureSlopo` a `detail: undefined` on the same path,
so a per-site fix would have left two more of these waiting.
The probe also now omits `error` rather than assigning undefined, since it is a
plausible thing for another consumer to read.
Four regression tests, and they were checked against a negative control: with the
sanitiser reverted and the undefined restored, exactly the "probe SUCCEEDS" test
fails with "does not survive a JSON round trip" and the others still pass, which
is what makes it a test of this bug rather than of the JSON round trip in
general.
The probe tests use an injected fetch, so they cover the shapes that matter
without a network: a matching width, a mismatch, an HTTP error, an unreachable
host, a timeout, and the key being sent only when there is one.
The client tests evaluate the bundle the way the real module loader does —
inside `window.__ModuleLoader__.load` — with a fake `require` that answers
`react` and throws on anything else. That throw is the point: it is the check
that the card stays inside the platform's seed table, which is the constraint a
hand-written client half is most likely to break. The card is then rendered by
expanding its element tree, and its handlers are driven directly to prove that a
changed field reaches `set`, a cleared field reaches `unset`, a number field is
sent as a number, a list round-trips through comma-separated text, and a
read-only namespace disables everything.
The status test moves with the behaviour: status may now run a read-only
`--version`, so the assertion is that it executes nothing else.
dsh-bash-sandbox is the composed ctx.shell, and its resolve() stamps
`request.sandboxPolicy ?? ctx.sandboxPolicy.resolve()`. Omitting the policy
therefore does NOT mean "unconfined" -- it silently substitutes the DEPLOYMENT
default (`DSH_PERMISSION_MODE ?? 'workspace-write'`) for the session's preset.
On a host with no sandbox runner that confines a danger-full-access session and
fails with SandboxUnavailableError before slopo is ever reached, which is
exactly what happened: the tool was unusable while bash worked.
Resolve the calling session's policy the way dsh-tool-bash does, and pass it on
every call. A confining executor with no ctx.sandboxPolicy is now refused
outright rather than guessed at.
That fix exposes a second problem worth naming. Slopo's state lives under
$DSH_HOME, which is outside the workspace root a workspace-write sandbox permits
writing to, so under that preset nothing would work. The tool now refuses before
running and names both ways out -- run under danger-full-access, or set stateDir
to a directory inside the workspace -- instead of letting a write fail halfway
through an embed.
Five tests pin this: the session's policy is resolved exactly once and travels
with the session, a missing policy service is refused, state outside the sandbox
is refused before any execution, state inside it proceeds, and status/configure
never touch the shell at all.
The integration tests load the real plugin module against a thin mock Cordis
context and drive the tool through a real shell into the real slopo binary. The
mock implements only the seams the plugin touches, so a wrong assumption about a
dsh service fails a test instead of producing a plugin that silently does
nothing at runtime.
Two real bugs were caught this way and are now pinned:
* renderSlopoConfig would write the embedding API key to disk if it were
handed one. It cannot now.
* --config-version was placed before the subcommand, which slopo rejects with
exit code 2. It is declared on the command, not the callback.
The end-to-end test is opt-in (DSH_SLOPO_E2E=1) because it needs a reachable
embedding backend; it indexes a real repository, embeds it, and asserts a real
duplicate cluster comes back.
dsh-slopo agent