feat(adb_command): selectable target, strict resolution, and a real response (t14)

The user's live run could not select his Shield for
nvidia_shield.adb_command, so he ran his diagnostics through the deprecated
androidtv integration instead. Measured against the installed HA (2026.10.1),
the cause is a contract, not a bug in the handler:

* ServiceRegistry.async_register has NO target parameter, so a target cannot be
  declared at registration;
* the frontend renders the target picker from the service DESCRIPTION, which
  HA builds from services.yaml or from the runtime async_set_service_schema —
  and the runtime description WINS.

So async_setup now registers with supports_response=OPTIONAL and publishes
ADB_COMMAND_SERVICE_DESCRIPTION (target: {entity: [{domain: media_player}]},
fields, prose mirrored in strings.json/translations/en.json and pinned against
both by a test). No services.yaml is needed, and none is added.

The target resolution is strict, because the failure mode of guessing is a raw
shell command on the wrong device: exactly one PARTICIPANT, told apart as
no_target (nothing selected), unsupported_target (not a participant / option
off / another integration's entity) and ambiguous_target (two selected — sent
to neither). Accepts what HA actually sends: entity_id as text or as the LIST a
picked target produces, and device_id (an automation targeting the DEVICE),
expanded only through this integration's own registry entries and only to media
players. The output now comes back in the response under adb_response — the key
the user's captures read — while an unreachable Shield stays adb_unavailable,
an error rather than an empty response, and a call that does not ask for a
response is unchanged.

Evidence: 12 real-HA tests (new tests/test_adb_command_real_ha.py) drive the
real service registry, the real get_services websocket payload (the exact JSON
bytes the browser parses: target present, response optional, both fields) and
real async_call for every shape above. t14's CI gate globs tests/test_*real_ha.py
so a new real-HA file cannot skip silently; the skip/empty-collection guards stay
and were executed. The real-HA probe also caught async_entries_for_device being
a MODULE-LEVEL helper (not a registry method) that the stub had hidden, so the
drift gate's owner map now covers async_register, async_set_service_schema and
async_entries_for_device, with the call-argument floor raised 44 -> 52.

Verify: suites 681/4 and 682/3; real-HA 38 + the new file 12 (50 with the glob);
ruff clean; drift exit 0 (54 call arguments).
This commit is contained in:
James Mackay committed 2026-10-12 11:23:47 +01:00
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@@ -162,14 +162,58 @@ the contractual path (YAML is the seed, the flow is the truth).
### Raw `adb_command` service (opt-in)
When enabled in the integration's options (`adb_command_enabled`, **default
off**), the integration registers the `nvidia_shield.adb_command` service:
send a raw ADB shell command to the entry's persistent connection
(`{"command": "your-command", "entity_id": "media_player.<yours>"}` — the
entity is optional when exactly one entry provides the service). This is the
same security posture as the Home Assistant core `androidtv` integration: a
documented, opt-in escape hatch for debugging and automation, registered at
setup and unregistered when the last participating entity unloads. It
rejects (logs a warning, sends nothing) when the ADB connection is down.
off**), the integration registers the `nvidia_shield.adb_command` service: send a
raw ADB shell command to the entry's persistent connection.
**Picking the Shield in the UI.** The action declares a target, so **Developer
tools → Actions** (and the automation editor) offers a target picker whose entity
list contains the Shield's `media_player` entity — the same way the core
`androidtv` integration's action worked. Select the Shield there, type the
command, and call it.
Home Assistant renders that picker from the action's *target description*, which
the integration publishes at setup — that is why the Shield is selectable at all.
**As YAML / automation data**, the same call:
```yaml
- action: nvidia_shield.adb_command
target:
entity_id: media_player.shield
data:
command: getprop ro.product.model
response_variable: adb # optional: keep the output in a variable
```
- `command` (**required**) — the shell command. An empty one is an error
(`invalid_command`), never a silent no-op.
- The target (**required**) is the Shield's `media_player` entity, or its
`device_id` (`target: {device_id: …}` / `entity_id: …`). There is **no
"pick the only one" fallback**: with no target the call fails with `no_target`,
two targets fail with `ambiguous_target`, and an entity that does not participate
(its entry has the option off) fails with `unsupported_target` — a raw shell
command is never sent to a Shield you did not select.
- **The output comes back** in the response under `adb_response` — the same key the
deprecated `androidtv.adb_command` action returned, so a template written against
that integration keeps reading the same field:
```yaml
- action: nvidia_shield.adb_command
target: {entity_id: media_player.shield}
data: {command: "getprop ro.product.model"}
response_variable: adb
- action: notify.persistent_notification
data:
message: "{{ adb.adb_response }}"
```
A caller that does not ask for a response is unchanged (the response is
*optional*, not required). If ADB is down the action raises `adb_unavailable` —
an error, never an empty response; a transport failure mid-command propagates as
an error too.
This is the same security posture as the Home Assistant core `androidtv`
integration: a documented, opt-in escape hatch for debugging and automation,
registered at setup and unregistered when the last participating entity unloads.
### Screen capture (opt-in, manual)